We study the evolution of industrial concentration in twelve manufacturing sectors in Indian industry over the period 1970-99. Our aim is to examine the impact of economic liberalisation on concentration. Given the strong regulation of Indian industry till the mid 1980s, the market structure in most industries was largely an product of government policy. With deregulation, we might expect the pattern of concentration to be determined by the interaction between the technological characteristics of the industry and what we might call the normal competitive processes.
Introduction
The economic reforms of 1991 are often seen as a watershed in the management of Indian industry. Through much of the 1960s and 1970s Indian industry was highly regulated and protected. Most formal manufacturing sectors were subject to licensing requirements and capacity controls. Many sectors were reserved for the public sector or for small-scale firms. Controls on imports and tariffs protected Indian industry from foreign competition. In a process that arguably began in the 1980s, but gained prominence after 1991, Indian industry has been progressively deregulated and exposed to domestic and foreign competition. In this paper we study the impact of this liberalisation on patterns of industrial concentration in Indian manufacturing.
In the regulated phase the pattern of industrial concentration was a direct outcome of industrial policy. Early regulation was guided by a perceived need to conserve scarce capital: in order to prevent 'unnecessary duplication of investment', in many sectors production licenses were restricted to a handful of firms. Market shares were determined largely, though not entirely, by capacity allocations at the level of individual firms and plants. Sectors subject to such licensing requirements and capacity regulations were, quite often, relatively concentrated. On the other hand some sectors were reserved for small-scale firms to support higher levels of employment: if firms were required to be below some size, these sectors would have been relatively fragmented. With deregulation, we might expect the pattern of concentration to be determined by the interaction between the technological characteristics of the industry and what we might call the normal competitive processes.
How does competition affect the levels of industrial concentration? The traditional 'size-structure relationship' contends that industries in which the size of the market is large relative to setup costs, competitive entry would result in a fragmented market structure. Sutton (1991 Sutton ( , 1998 pointed out that for industries that were technologyintensive or advertising-intensive this simple relationship may break down: If larger markets create incentives for a competitive escalation of advertising and technology expenditures, the heightened level of such expenditures may preclude fragmentation.
Thus the pattern of industrial concentration in unregulated markets might be sensitive to a range of variables: notably, setup costs, advertising expenditure and technology expenditures of firms. Relying on the framework developed by Sutton, we refer to these factors collectively as the 'sunk cost variables'.
We study the pattern of concentration for a cross-section of 53 manufacturing sectors of Indian manufacturing over the period 1980-99. For a subset of twelve manufacturing sectors (for which a longer time series was available), we also study the evolution of concentration over the period 1970-99. Studying concentration is of interest because it is indicative, at least in unregulated markets, of the degree of market power of firms. If indeed the above sunk costs variables influence concentration levels in unregulated markets, we would expect these variables to become more significant in the post-liberalisation phase. The greater role of these variables may well lead to a decrease in industrial concentration in some sectors, but could result in higher levels of concentration in advertising-and technology-intensive industries.
Industrial concentration in India was definitely affected by these policy changes.
However we find that the crucial determinants of changes in concentration differ across industries. This suggests that the nature of competition differs across sectors, which may imply the need for sector-specific competition policies. We also assess the importance of industry specific differences in competition and 'behavioural' differences in competition due the strategic conduct of firms as the policy environment changed competitive rules within an industry.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on concentration and outlines the liberalisation of industrial policy in India.
Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 discusses our empirical findings and Section 5 concludes with a summary of our findings and their implications for the design of future industrial policy.
Factors influencing concentration
Industrial concentration refers to the extent to which production is concentrated amongst firms in an industry. For unregulated industries, a long-standing and plausible approach relates concentration levels to setup costs in that industry. The latter refers to the cost of setting up a plant of minimum efficient scale, which is determined primarily by the technology in use in that industry. If the size of the market (say, the average level of demand) can support only a handful of firms operating at minimum efficient scale, the equilibrium structure would be relatively concentrated. Larger markets can accommodate more firms of efficient size, and so would be more fragmented. As Sutton (1991) has pointed out, this size-structure relationship may be tempered by the intensity of price competition in an industry. In industries where price competition is very intense, profit margins are lower, and firms may be unable to recoup the setup costs. Such intense price competition would make a fragmented market structure harder to sustain. Consequently, equilibrium levels of concentration are likely to be higher.
The size-structure relation may even break down in industries in which advertising and technology play an important role. Suppose the nature of the industry or product is such that firms have an incentive to increase such expenditures to gain market shares. In the long run, the increased level of expenditures is sustainable only if profitability is high enough. Relatively fragmented market structures are unlikely to sustain such high levels of profitability, resulting in the creation of a more concentrated structure through gradual exit and consolidation of firms. To the extent the level of advertising and technology expenditure is endogenous to the market structure, larger market size may be associated with an escalation of sunk costs in advertising or technology expenditures, with no concomitant reduction in concentration.
Thus, Sutton's framework offers some theoretical insights regarding the relationship between market size and market structure. For industries in which advertising and technology do not play a major role, concentration is likely to be a decreasing function of market size, measured relative to setup costs. However, in industries where technology and/or advertising matter, the size-structure relationship is more complex. Sutton's analysis is more nuanced than this casual summary suggests, but it helps us to identify the variables that may be relevant to the determination of industrial structure: apart from the technologically-given setup costs, the endogenously-determined level of advertising expenditures and technology expenditures all affect industrial concentration. In keeping with Sutton's terminology, we will refer to these as the 'sunk-cost variables'.
Our argument is that, given the tight regulatory framework prior to liberalization, these factors were unlikely to have mattered much in the determination of concentration. After liberalisation, the emergence of a broadly competitive environment created greater scope for advertising and expenditure on technology. To understand this, we review the changes in the policy environment in India.
Industrial and economic policy in India
Planned industrial development in India incorporated substantial control of industry.
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 reserved certain industries for the public sector, by prohibiting the entry of private-sector firms (examples include steel manufacture, aviation, petrochemicals). This was deemed necessary to release resources for public sector investment in the core sectors of the economy. The strategy of planned development ran into unforeseen crises (foreign exchange crises, two wars, two droughts). Industrial policy was quite reactive in the 1960s, but somewhat perversely moved towards more restriction to mitigate the visible symptoms of these crises. For instance, the foreign exchange crises paved the way for the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973) . The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act aimed to control the perceived abuse of the licensing system by the big business houses. These changes are detailed in Table la below.   (Tables 1a&b) By the mid-1980s, a long period of industrial stagnation, especially technological stagnation, created pressure for deregulation. As early as 1984, there was some limited liberalization of industrial policy and import policy. The New Industrial Policy in 1991 carried this process further. Table 1b shows that many of these changes reversed the earlier restrictive policies. It is interesting that unlike the previous crises that had led to a more restrictive environment, the crises of the late 1980s led to Some sectors were reserved for the small-scale sector, in order to mitigate the perverse consequences of capital-intensive industrialization in a labour-surplus economy. While only a few industries were so reserved initially --the Third FiveYear Plan (1961-66) listed only nine -by the late 1970s, the scope of the small scale sector had expanded to cover most products that could be produced in the small scale sector. Given that small firms risked losing their preferential status if they expanded output, its implications for concentration were obvious. According to Gang (1995) three sectors ---mechanical engineering, chemical products and auto ancillariesaccounted for most of the small firms. In these sectors, the regulatory regime created artificially low levels of concentration.
In some cases, a dualistic structure emerged with some large firms and a fringe of small producers, with little movement between categories of firms. Where sectors were reserved for small-scale manufacture, but incumbent firms were allowed to continue at frozen capacities (e.g. in the soap industry), such a dualistic structure was the natural outcome.
On the whole, the pattern of concentration during the regulated phase was a product of government design rather than market forces. Not surprisingly, deregulation changed things. The early deregulation of the 1980s introduced 'broadbanding' of production licenses: this change allowed firms to use their existing licensed capacity (previously tied to a narrow product specification) to manufacture a broader range of related product. Though licensing requirements were formally retained, they were granted more easily. The later New Economic Policy of 1991 abandoned formal licensing requirements in most but not all industrial sectors. These changes facilitated fresh entry in some sectors, lowering concentration levels. In 1985, the government introduced legislation to enable the exit of inefficient or 'sick' (i.e., chronically unprofitable) firms, which increased concentration in other sectors.
Overall liberalization created an environment in which market structure was fashioned more by market forces than government policy. Levels of concentration in Indian industry were also influenced by the policy towards foreign investment and imports. In the wake of the foreign exchange crises of the 1960s, the economic regime became relatively hostile to new investment by foreign firms. This tended to preserve the relatively concentrated structure in some industries that were dominated by incumbent foreign firms (see Athreye and Kapur, 2001 ). Imports were restricted through licensing and tariffs, ostensibly to conserve foreign exchange and provide protection to the fledgling industries. Prior to 1978, import licenses were the preferred mode and they were issued on the basis of the twin criteria of 'essentiality' and 'domestic non-availability'. Domestic availability was judged without reference to price, and with the broad based growth of manufacturing, it became relatively difficult to meet this non-availability criterion. Tariff policy acted to complement these quantitative restrictions. At an average rate of 122%, tariffs in India in the late-1980s were higher than most other countries.
1 Tariffs insulated many sectors from price competition: this allowed many inefficient firms to survive, and may have supported a more fragmented structure relative to what stronger price competition may have created.
With import liberalisation, tariff levels fell (see Table 1b It is tempting to relate changes in concentration directly to the key policy changes (say the policies on entry or exit, for instance). However we view deregulation as enabling concentration levels to approach their 'equilibrium' values, and these are determined by a host of factors. In particular, we look at how the effect of policy changes was mediated through their impact on the 'sunk cost' variables. For instance, rather than relate changing concentration levels in the passenger car industry to policy changes directly, we aim to study how policy changes affected the strategic behaviour of firms in this sector. Notably, technology intensity rose sector-wide after 1980; the proliferation of models has been accompanied by increased marketing expenditures.
As the industry adapted to modern assembly lines, set-up costs for new entrants rose.
In this paper, we study the relationship between concentration and these sunk-cost variables, both across and within various manufacturing sectors.
Empirical methodology

The econometric model
The econometric model aims to model changes in concentration across industries and overtime. We follow existing empirical studies in modelling changes in concentration as an adaptive process. Let it C denote the concentration level in industry i in period t. . In our model, we consider three kinds of sunk cost variables, so that k=1,2,3.
The reduced form of the above dynamic model can be written as:
Pesaran and Smith (1995) caution against an automatic use of pooled data in dynamic estimations, such as (2) For the twelve industries for which the dynamic model was estimated, the structural parameters could also be recovered from the reduced equation (2): we have λ i = (1-θ 5 ) and β k = (θ k /λ). Estimating this equation thus tells us about the influence of particular factors in influencing concentration in each industry. The results and the recovered values of the structural parameters are contained in Table 5 , and discussed in Section 4.1.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) have also shown that if the parameters are random across industry and independent of W, the long-run relationship can be estimated from the levels cross-section * '
where β is the mean of the i β , and * α will reflect average intercept and mean trend effect. We do not estimate the dynamic model from the cross-section, because the average of the lagged dependent variable is clearly endogenous. Further, if the time span of the data is long enough, the average of these cross sectional coefficients do provide a consistent estimate of the average long term effect of each of the W factors.
In the presence of heterogeneity in the underlying slope coefficients, the mean group estimator based on (3) may provide a better measure of the long term impact of the factors influencing concentration.
Thus, we estimate 20 cross-section levels regressions (based on (3) 
Data and Variables
We use a longitudinal data set of balance-sheet data, from 1970 to 1999, of publiclylisted manufacturing companies to estimate our model. The data we use is maintained by the Reserve Bank of India and is described in Appendix 1. The data identify an industrial sector code for each firm. This allows us to aggregate data across firms for any particular industrial sector of interest. Thus, for example, advertising intensity would be the sum of advertising expenditures by all firms in the industry as percentage of the total sales of the industry. The measure of concentration we use as the dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the Herfindahl index. This index is constructed as the squared sum of market shares of all firms in any industrial sector. There are alternative measures of industrial concentration. The simplest measure would consider the number of active firms in the industry. Alternatively, we could have considered the n-firm concentration ratio: the share of industry output controlled by the largest n firms. Kambhampati (1996) , for instance, uses the four-firm concentration ratio. We find that the Herfindahl index is more suitable for longer spans of data. 3 The dependent variable, HERF2 is the value of the index expressed in percentage terms. The lagged value of HERF2 also enters in the dynamic estimations (for each industry over time)
as an independent variable.
We included three measures of sunk cost proxying the size-setup ratio, marketing intensity and technology intensity of industries. MKTINT is the industry's marketing intensity measured as the total of all advertising and selling expenses as a percentage of industry sales. Firms in our dataset report 'selling expenses' separately from advertising expenses. The former include sales commissions to retailers, which are quite important to maintenance of distribution networks in rural areas and nonmetropolitan settings with poor reach of conventional advertising channels. We use a 2 ADF tests for the time series variables are contained in Appendix 2. 3 Since the Herfindahl index combines information on the variance of shares and numbers it can be decomposed in interesting ways. Using the same data set, Kambhampati and Kattuman (2003) SIZSETUP is the ratio of industry sales to average net fixed assets. T refers to time, and NUMBER is control variable for the number of reporting firms. The
Herfindahl index is quite sensitive to the number of firms included especially in sectors where numbers are small or in years when there is a fall in numbers due to non-reporting by certain firms. This also affects the calculation of size to set-up costs where the denominator is the average of net fixed assets across firms in an industrial sector in any one year. For both these reasons we use the number of reporting firms as a control variable for possible measurement errors.
( Table 2 here) Table 2 summarises the variables used in the analysis, and indicates the hypothesised sign on the coefficients.
Results
The first part of our empirical analysis addresses the issue of what causes the variability of concentration equation over time: is this variability due to differences in the response of firms to the new policies or is it because the new policies favoured different industrial sectors differently? Consider our example from the automobile sector. Was the variability in concentration in the passenger cars market due to the fact that import liberalisation allowed firms like Maruti Udyog and Tatas to import technology and so win greater market shares over their competitors, or was it because freer imports of technology were always more likely to influence concentration in the technology intensive automobiles sector more than, say, in sugar or breweries?
To examine this question we decompose the variability in the three W variables and in concentration into between and within industry components of variation. If the former component dominates the overall variation then we could say that concentration was mostly determined by the changes in the nature of industries. If the latter component dominates then of course we would conclude it was firm strategies that changed concentration more.
( Table 3 here) Table 3 reports both the mean values and the between and within variance of the variables over the period 1980-99. Over the liberalisation period, in all cases, the between variance dominated the total variance -implying that the differences between sectors in concentration and the sunk cost variables was larger than their differences over time.
The dynamic model
We use time series data for twelve industries. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics.
The first row reports the mean value of the dependent variable, averaged over time for each of the twelve industries. Concentration ranges from around 4% (for the sugar industry) to over 20% for machine tools, and wool textiles.
( Table 4 here)
Regression estimates for the dynamic model are reported next in Table 5 . Overall these results cast serious doubts about the usefulness of pooled or panel estimations of equation (2). We used a method described by Boyd and Smith (2000) to examine departures from the long-run pooled mean. As we discussed in Section 3, for these twelve industries this can be obtained by averaging the industry coefficients. Table 6 reports the deviations of each industry's coefficient (normalized by the standard error of the average mean). As can be seen some of these deviations are very large (greater than 1) especially in the case of marketing intensity and technology intensity. A panel estimation imposing a single slope coefficient on the entire panel would be inappropriate and would also yield inconsistent (and biased) estimates of the common slope coefficient.
( Table 6 here)
The interesting question for us is to understand is why there are these different patterns across industrial sectors. For some industries, namely cotton textiles and brewery, we find that the 'sunk cost' variables are not significant in explaining concentration. This is not surprising given that in these sectors government policy control has survived in the form of lingering capacity regulation, control over pricing or reservation as small-scale industries. Sectors that were liberalized to a greater extent (in our sample this includes auto vehicles, machine tools, dyes and paper) allowed a much greater play for market forces. Here the sunk cost variables do affect levels of concentration.
Where the sunk cost variables do have a significant impact upon concentration, they often have the wrong sign from that predicted in 84, 1985-99, 1991-99 and 1970-99 . The results reported in Table 7 do indeed confirm the change in underlying coefficient values after 1985. In particular, the relationship between concentration and the size set-up ratio emerges as positive and significant in the later period.
Cross-section estimates
( Table 7 here)
Conclusion
Prior to liberalization, market structure in Indian manufacturing was largely an artifact of government policy. This was hardly surprisingly given the nature and extent of regulatory control. We would expect deregulation and liberalization to alter the picture, though the precise effects could vary across industries. Concentration levels may rise or fall depending on the specifics of individual sectors. The dynamic picture within individual sectors could be complicated too, as deregulation alters the strategic choices of incumbents and enables new entry. This variability suggests the need for a sector-specific rather than general examination of the impact of deregulation on concentration. Looking across sectors, we also find that concentration was more affected by sunk cost variables in the period before 1991 than after.
The fact that implications of deregulation for concentration differ across sectors strongly supports the need for a sector-specific approach to competition policy. While this is quite common practice in developed countries, many developing economies have yet to develop this approach. Recent discussions of the Competition Bill suggest that India is taking the right path. A second implication suggested by our analysis in Section 1 is that policy changes respond to increases in levels of concentration: in that sense regulatory policy may have an element of 'endogeneity'. Restrictions on the operation of managing agencies, which affected the operation of many British companies in India Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956 Articulated the role of public investment in planned development and specified: Schedule A industries reserved exclusively for state enterprises Schedule B industries where further expansion would be by state enterprises Corporate Tax policies, 1957 Tax policies, -1991 Specified rates of corporate tax on companies incorporated outside India. These were usually between 15-20% higher than the rates applied to large Indian companies during this period.
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969
All applications for a license from companies belonging to a list of big business houses and subsidiaries of foreign companies were to be referred to a 'MRTP Commission' which invited objections and held public hearings before granting a license for production. Industrial Policy Notification, 1973 Made licensing mandatory for all industries above certain investment limits Specified industry Schedules IV and V , where licensing was mandatory for all firms irrespective of size Small scale industry reservation introduced for some industries. Small was defined based on an investment limit. Industrial Policy Statement, 1973 Specified the criteria and list of Appendix I of 'core' industries to which large business houses and foreign firms were to be confined. Main criteria for being an Appendix 1 industry were that of local non-availability or domination of a sector by a single foreign firm. Schedule A industries from IPR, 1956 could not figure in the Appendix 1 list. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 Foreign companies operating in India were required to educe their share in equity capital to below 40%. Exceptions were decided on a discretionary basis if: The company was engaged in 'core' activities ( as defined in IPS, 1973) The company was using sophisticated technology or Met certain export commitments Industrial Policy Resolution 1977
Expanded the scope of reservations of particular lines of business activity for production in the small scale industrial sector. Small industry concessions would be lost if firm grew to a certain 'large' size. Business houses were not restricted to Appendix 1 industries as long as they moved to industrially backward regions Minimum asset limit defining business houses was raised from Rs. 200 million to Rs. 1 billion Amendment to MRTP Act, 1985 A company could be referred to the MRTP commission only if it showed assets greater than Rs. 1 billion.
New Industrial Policy 1991
Abolished licensing for all except 18 industries. Large companies no longer needed MRTP approval for capacity expansions Number of industries reserved for the public sector in Schedule A (IPR1951), cut down from 17 to 8; Schedule B was abolished altogether. Small firms were allowed to offer upto 24% of shareholding to large enterprises. Limits on foreign equity holdings were raised from 40 to 51% in a wide range of industries and foreign exchange outflows as dividends were balanced by export earnings. EXIM scrips (import entitlements linked to export earnings) were introduced and were freely tradable and could be used for all categories of imports. Actual user requirements for import of capital goods, raw materials and components under OGL were removed. Royalty limits increased to encourage technology imports. Policy announcements, 1992-99
Number of industries requiring licensing steadily decreased. By 1998 the number of industries requiring compulsory licensing was down to 9. Oil exploration and Minerals were removed from list of reserved industries for the public sector, bringing the number of Schedule A industries down to 6. Infrastructure industries like basic telecom and power opened to private ownership (including foreign ownership). Small scale industry reservations decreased: 15 items including ready made garments are removed from reserved list. Investment limit for defining a firm as small scale raised from Rs. 7.5 million to Rs. 30 million. Pricing of coal, drugs and pharmaceuticals de-regulated. Tariff reductions, 1992-99 Peak tariffs reduced to 110% in 1992 and gradually brought down to 40% in 1998. List of freely importable goods expanded Reform of structure of tariffs.
Source for Table 1 : Adapted from Sivadasan, J. (2002) , with authors' additions. (ii) The between mean is calculated over 53 industrial sectors and is x i. The within mean is calculated as ( x it -x i + x ) where x is the global mean computed over 1441 observations. The Reserve Bank of India conducts censuses of the public and private limited companies at periodic intervals (typically every 5 years). We rely here on these unpublished data on medium and large non-government, non-financial, public limited companies (i.e. those quoted on the stock exchange). Summary statistics based on this data are published periodically as reports on the Finances of Medium and Large Public Limited Companies. The coverage of industrial sectors is not complete as the Annual Survey of Industries. The exclusion of small firms is not a serious omission: except in a handful of sectors (e.g. leather) they are unlikely to be the principal competitors of publicly listed firms. The exclusion of government-owned companies is more serious as, over time, they came to contribute a substantial fraction of manufacturing output in the economy. The exclusion of 'unlisted' companies misses out firms such as the automobile giant Maruti Udyog Ltd (owned by Suzuki, Japan and the Government of India).
The data is longitudinal and, as available for the period 1965-2001 as a sequence of surveys. For confidentiality of financial data, companies are identified by a company code rather than company names. Firms are assigned to a three-digit industry code based on their primary activity. Reporting of firms is not uniform across all years and so the number of firms in an industry also fluctuates due to reporting. The cross-section analysis used data on 53 industry groups. Industries that appeared to be miscellaneous groupings were deliberately excluded. The industry coverage of data improves in later years and complete data for all industries are available from 1983. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 year coefficent values 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 year coefficent values 6 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 year coefficent values
